The Language of Thought Hypothesis: An Aristotelian–Thomistic Perspective

The language of thought (LoT) hypothesis has been, since the 1960s and 1970s, and arguably still is, the most central approach to understanding human thought in psychology. LoT hypothesis has many strengths but has also been critiqued in many respects. Here, we focus on the philosophical underpinnings assumed by LoT hypothesis. This article will (a) present a brief history of modern philosophy’s approach to mental representation, (b) consider Fodor’s representational theory of mind (RTM) and LoT hypothesis in some detail, (c) briefly examine some of the problems associated with mental representations and mentalese, (d) offer an Aristotelean–Thomistic (A–T) alternative perspective, and (e) compare the A–T perspective to modern RTM and LoT hypothesis. Ultimately, we argue that the A–T perspective includes many of the strengths of RTM and LoT hypothesis but avoids many of the philosophical problems with modern views of representationalism, as well as suggesting appropriate limits on what aspects of thinking should actually be thought of as being like an LoT.